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The publicity attendant upon the "energy crisis" confronting the
United States and increasing prices for oil and gas have induced growing
percentages of landowners or mineral interest owners' and oil and gas
operators negotiating oil and gas leasing transactions to seek legal counsel
at some point in their negotiations. An oil and gas operator usually con-
sults either staff legal counsel or a law firm which represents other oil and
gas operators, so that as a general rule operators are served by legal counsel
who are familiar with the problems involved in leasing transactions and
with the particular characteristics of their client's business. In contrast, a
landowner is likely to seek advice from his family attorney or from a
lawyer whose office happens to be convenient to him. Frequently, those
private practitioners are inexperienced in oil and gas law and in the prac-
ticalities of oil and gas operations, with the result that they may have dif-
ficulty in advising their clients as to what ought and ought not to be includ-
ed in an oil and gas lease.
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I For convenience, reference throughout the remainder of this article will be to
"landowners," rather than to "landowners or mineral interest owners." If the mineral rights have
been severed from the surface rights, oil and gas leasing negotiations will be between the mineral
rights owner and the prospective lessee and will not ordinarily involve the surface owner. Compare
Phillips Pet. Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957). A broader range of problems is
presented, however, where the surface owner also owns the mineral rights.
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This article is directed to the particular problems of counseling land-
owners or mineral interest owners in oil and gas leasing transactions. It is
not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of either oil and gas law or oil and
gas leases,2 but rather it seeks to identify those matters likely to be of im-
portance to landowners and to suggest measures which may protect those
interests. Particular attention is given to those aspects of oil and gas law
which may be troublesome to counsel for a landowner, either because his
experience and instinct are likely to be misleading in handling them, or
because they are unique to oil and gas law.
The Oil and Gas Lease
Perhaps the most basic point to be made with respect to oil and gas
leasing is that there is no such thing as a "standard" lease. In theory, every
clause of an oil and gas lease is open to negotiation between the parties. In
practice, however, some clauses are so well accepted by custom or are
regarded as so important by oil and gas operators that deviations from the
norm are extremely difficult to negotiate. Nevertheless, there is wide varia-
tion in terms from lease to lease. The so-called "Producers 88" form,
which many landowners frequently request, is found in so many different
versions that the caption is meaningless.'
Conceptually, the oil and gas lease is a simple transaction. The lessor
grants to the lessee the right to search for and produce oil and gas for a
primary term which may range from a few days or months to as many as
twenty years. 4 The lessee's property interest is terminable as it may be cut
short by his failure to pay periodic rents' which are paid to justify failure to
drill a well during the primary term,6 or by expiration of the primary term
2 For an exhaustive treatment of oil and gas law in general, see the multi-volume treatises
of H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW (1977); W. SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS (1954-68 &
Supp. 1977); E. KUNTZ, OIL AND GAS (1962-77). For consideration of oil and gas leases in par-
ticular, seeE. BROWN, OILAND GAS LEASES (2d ed. 1973 & Supp. 1977).
3 See Fagg v. Texas Co., 57 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Ct. App. 1933), holding that a contract to ex-
ecute a lease on a "Producers 88 Form" is too indefinite to be enforceable. The court found the
form "as incapable of definite application as if the term 'oil and gas lease form' had been used in-
stead." Id. at 89. For a history of lease forms including the origin of the "Producers 88 Form,"
see Moses, The Evolution and Development of the Oil and Gas Lease, 2d S.W. LEGAL
FOUNDATION INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION. 1(1951).
4 The purpose of the primary term in an oil and gas lease is to provide the lessee an op-
portunity to explore the premises to determine the probability of the presence of commercial quan-
tities of oil and gas. See the discussion accompanying note 77, infra. The more speculative it is that
oil and gas will be found in commercial quantities, the more likely it is that the lessee will insist
upon a long primary term.
5 The periodic rents are called "delay rentals." See the discussion at H. WILLIAMS & C.
MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS 138 (4th ed. 1976).
6 This is true only of the most common type of lease, the "unless" lease. See the discussion
accompanying note 85, infra.
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without the production of oil or gas from a well on the premises in quan-
tities sufficient to satisfy the lease. However, the lease may be extended to
a secondary term "for so long thereafter as oil and gas are produced" 7 by
production of oil and gas and payment of a percentage of the gross produc-
tion, free of the expenses of production, to the lessor.' Thus, in simple
terms, the common elements of an oil and gas lease include a grant of ex-
ploratory rights for a stated term in exchange for payment of rentals, with
the right of extension for the duration of the productive life of wells drilled
on the property if development is successful, in exchange for a percentage
of gross production to be paid to the landowner.9
The basic scheme of the oil and gas lease has been complicated over
the years by the tendency of courts to interpret leases strictly against
lessees," often resulting in forfeiture or termination of the lessees' in-
terests, and by countervailing attempts of lessees' lawyers to draft
documents which will not subject their clients to economic disadvantage.
Although the struggle continues, it is fair to say that the operators' legal
7 A secondary term of indefinite duration is necessary because neither the lessor nor the
lessee can know when the lease is given how long wells drilled on the property will produce. There
are both practical and statutory limitations on the rate at which a given well or reservoir can be
produced. See generally, INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION, A REPORT OF OIL AND GAS
CONSERVATION ACTIVITIES (1964).
8 The percentage of gross production paid to the lessor is called "royalty." Seethe discus-
sion at WILLIAMS & MEYERS, MANUAL OF TERMS, supra note 5, at 511.
9 Generally, in classifying the interest that a landowner possesses in the oil and gas under
his land the courts have embraced either an ownership or nonownership theory. In an ownership
theory state, the landowner is the owner of the oil and gas in place, subject to the correlative right
of other landowners to capture it and bring it to the surface from wells drilled and bottomed on
their own property. In a nonownership theory state, the landowner possesses an exploratory right
akin to a profita prendre. E.g., Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 P. 86 (1918). Under this lat-
ter theory ownership does not vest until the oil and gas is captured. Because conceptually a
landowner can grant no greater rights than he himself has, a lessee in an ownership theory state
may receive either ownership of the oil and gas or a profit a prendre, while a lessee operating in a
nonownership state obtains only a profit. Occasionally, however, courts have not been constrained
by such theoretical limitations. For the theory of ownership advanced in the various states and the
consequences that result from the disparate theories, see I WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, at
§§ 203-204.9; 1 KUNTZ, supra note 2, at § 2.4; 1 SUMMERS, supra note 2, at § 62.
10 See, e.g., Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Guertzgen, 100 F.2d 299 (9th Cir. 1938); Skelly Oil
Co. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 160 Kan. 226, 160 P.2d 246 (1945); Magnolia Pet. Co. v. Vaughn, 195
Okla. 662, 161 P.2d 762 (1945). Real property leases are usually interpreted against the lessor. The
most common explanation given of the courts' reversal of the thrust of interpretation is that oil
and gas leases are usually prepared by the lessee and, therefore, any ambiguities ought to be resolv-
ed against him. Hinson v. Noble, 122 S.W.2d 1082 (Tex. Ct. App. 1938). To the extent that this is
the rationale, the rule may not be relied upon if the landowner prepares the lease or actively
negotiates its terms. Briggs v. Waggoner, 375 P.2d 896 (Okla. 1962); Lucky Thirteen Oil Syndicate
v. Barrett, 158 Okla. 98, 12 P.2d 233 (1932). The tendency toward strict interpretation against the
lessee may also be explained by the fact that disputes over oil and gas lease terms usually go to trial
in the area in which the landowner lives, before judges residing in'the area who may have to stand
for election from time to time, and before juries composed of other landowners.
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draftsmen have largely won the battle by the development of a multitude of
long and complicated clauses." Thus, most lease forms that will be
presented as the basis for negotiation of the leasing transaction will be
presented by operators and may be expected to be highly favorable to
operators. Many of the clauses in such forms should be of concern to
lawyers representing landowners. Some of these clauses should be substan-
tially modified before acceptance, and a few rejected outright. Thus, the
first step in effectively representing the landowner in a leasing transaction
is to recognize that most of the lease forms in circulation are "operator's
forms" which must be closely scrutinized.
The second and more difficult step for the landowner's lawyer is to
identify his client's interests and then to evaluate the proposed lease form
in light of those interests. While the interests of landowners will naturally
differ somewhat among individuals, it is possible to generalize and to con-
clude that the landowner's major concerns may be categorized into one or
more of three areas. First, the landowner will wish to protect himself
against an unreasonable interference by oil and gas operations with ex-
isting or expected uses of his land. Second, insofar as possible, the
landowner will wish to build into the agreement assurances of fair dealing
by the operator. Finally, the landowner will seek to maximize his return
from oil and gas operations on the land to be leased. Specific analysis will
follow under these general headings. It should be noted that many of the
particular topics could easily be discussed under more than one general
heading; the classifications are not exclusive.
Protection Against Interference With Existing
or Expected Uses of Land
The landowner engaged in negotiations for the granting of an oil and
gas lease is often greatly excited by the possibility that he may be sitting
upon a bonanza of oil and gas. Usually, however, there is a present or in-
tended use of the land which is of economic benefit to him. Therefore, en-
ticed as the landowner may be by the prospect of the development of oil
and gas on his premises, he often is, or ought to be, worried about the
possibility that oil and gas operations will adversely affect his present or in-
tended use of the property.
In protecting the landowner's interest in use of the surface of the
land, the first issue that must be addressed by the landowner's lawyer is
whether the grant of the lease will conflict with the rights of others in the
11 For an excellent and concise discussion of the development of the modern oil and gas
lease, see H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 600-602.6 (students' abridged ed.
1975). See also Moses, supranote3.
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property. The classic case arises when the owner and occupier of the sur-
face does not own the oil and gas rights; 2 the full mineral interest may
have been "severed" from the fee interest and the oil and gas rights be held
as separate property. 3 Because oil and gas leases typically contain a war-
ranty from the lessor to the lessee that the lessor owns the full mineral in-
terest in the leased property,14 and a proportionate reduction clause to the
effect that the royalties and rentals provided for are to be reduced propor-
tionately if the lessor does not own all of what he purports to lease," the
lessor's counsel ought to satisfy himself that his client does in fact own full
rights to the oil and gas interest to be leased.16 Because of the prevalence of
casual practices in the conveyance of real property in many areas of the
country, it is not unknown for the landowner's lawyer to discover that his
client does not own all or any of the oil and gas rights to his property. 7
Even where there has been no severance of the oil and gas interest
from the surface rights, if the property has been previously mortgaged, the
mortgage will take priority over the oil and gas lease.'" Moreover, it is like-
ly that the mortgage contains language to the effect that the property may
not be leased without permission of the mortgagee and provides for the
mortgagee's right either to accelerate the principal amount of the mortgage
12 The problem may also arise where the landowner owns the oil and gas rights but is
restricted in his use of them by equitable servitudes or zoning restrictions. See the discussion at 2
WILLIAMS& MEYERS, supra note 2, at § 517.
13 Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Carseloway, 45 F.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1930); Dabney-Johnston
Oil Corp. v. Walden, 4 Cal. 2d 637, 52 P.2d 237 (1935); Jilek v. Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin
Coal Co., 382 111241,47 N.E.2d 96 (1943).
14 For example, the following from a form frequently used in Ohio: "All covenants and
conditions between the parties hereto shall extend to their heirs, executors, successors and assigns
and the Lessor hereby warrants and agrees to defend the title to the land herein describe& Lessor
further agrees that the Lessee shall have the right at any time to redeem for Lessor, or otherwise
acquire by payment, any mortgage or any other liens upon the above described lands which in any
manner affect the Lessee's interest therein in the event of default of payment by Lessor and be
subrogated in full to all the rights of the holder thereof the same as if Lessee were the original
owner of said mortgage or lien." (Emphasis added.)
Is For example, the following from a form used in Texas: "If said lessor owns a less in-
terest in the above described land than the entire and undivided fee simple estate therein, then the
royalties and rentals herein provided shall be paid the lessor only in the proportion which his in-
terest bears to the whole and undivided fee; however, such rental shall be increased at the next suc-
ceeding rental anniversary after any reversion occurs to cover the interest so acquired."
16 The problem of divided ownership may arise in many contexts, e.g., concurrent owner-
ship, life estates and remainder interests, property held in trust, and dower rights. See2 WILLIAMS
& MEYERS, supra note 2, at § 512-20.
'7 Back v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 160 Ohio St. 81, 113 N.E.2d 865 (1953); Oklahoma City v.
Harper, 198 Okla. 493, 180 P.2d 162 (1947).
18 See Ledbetter, Mortgages on Land Affecting Subsequent Mineral Interests, 32 TEX. L.
REV. 740 (1954). See also 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, at § 518 and cases cited therein.
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or to apply the proceeds of any oil and gas lease to the principal balance. 9
Thus, if the property is subject to a mortgage, it is advisable to obtain the
mortgagee's subrogation to the lease. Subrogations are commonly freely
given by lending institutions, at least if the use of the land upon which basis
the mortgage was originally given will not be interfered with by oil and gas
operations.2"
A similar problem for the lawyer representing the landowner may
arise when the property to be leased for oil and gas exploration and
development is subject to an agricultural lease or to extensive utility or
right of way easements. It has been asserted that the interest of an oil and
gas lessee is subject to the rights of a prior agricultural lessee, so that the oil
and gas lessee cannot interfere with the possession or use of the property by
the surface lessee. 2 It is doubtful, however, that the few reported cases go
beyond the principle that the oil and gas lessee is subject to an implied
obligation not to interfere substantially with the senior agricultural lessee's
use of the surface and may be held liable for damages incurred by the
agricultural lessee from oil and gas operations, either by interference with
19 For example, the mortgage form currently used by the Federal Land Bank of Louisville
provides in relevant part: "The Mortgagor covenants and agrees:...
"(7) that there are hereby specifically assigned to the Mortgagee all rents, revenues,
damages and payments of every kind at any time accruing under or becoming payable on account
of the sale of any interest in any portion of said property and on account of any and all oil, gas,
mining and mineral leases, rights, or privileges of any kind now existing or that may hereafter
come into existence covering the said property, or on account of any condemnation proceeding or
other seizure of all or part thereof under the proceeding or other seizure of all or part thereof
under the right of eminent domain or otherwise, and the Mortgagee, at his option, may collect and
receive the same as the same become due and payable, and all moneys received by the Mortgagee
by reason of this assignment may be applied at the option of the Mortgagee, upon any unpaid
amounts of principal and/or interest, whether or not the same shall be due and payable; provided
that nothing herein shall be construed as a waiver of the priority of the lien of this mortgage over
any such lease, rights or privileges granted subsequent to the date of this mortgage:...
"(10) that if the Mortgagor shall sell the premises, or if the ownership of any portion
thereof shall be changed either by voluntary or involuntary transfer or by operation of law, or if
the Mortgagor defaults in the payment of said indebtedness, or with respect to any warranty, cove-
nant, or agreement herein contained, or if, in defending any action commenced to foreclose or en-
force a lien on any portion of the mortgaged premises, the Mortgagee elects to cross-claim and
foreclose the lien of this instrument, then, at the Mortgagee's option, the entire indebtedness
secured hereby shall forthwith become due and payable and bear interest at the rate set out for
defaulted payments in the promissory note secured hereby, and the Mortgagee shall have the right
to enter upon and take possession of said premises and to foreclose this instrument;... "(Emphasis
added.) La. F.L.B. 4-139; Ohio Revised 2-77. The specific reference to oil and gas leases in
paragraph (7) gives rise to the inference that the granting of an oil and gas lease would not be con-
sidered to be a sale for the purposes of the acceleration provisions of paragraph (10). Conceptual-
ly, however, an oil and gas lease is a conveyance.
20 For a subordination agreement form, see 6 SUMMERS, supra note 2, at § 1222.
21 Republic Nat. Gas Co. v. Melson, 274 P.2d 543 (Okla. 1954). See also Keeton & Jones,
Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 (1956).
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the agricultural lessee's use of the surface or by destruction of his growing
crops.22 Nevertheless, if the oil and gas lease contains a broadly phrased
warranty clause or proportionate reduction clause, the landowner may
face liability if he executes the lease covering land already subject to an
agricultural lease. More importantly, a dispute between the oil and gas
lessee and a prior agricultural lessee may effectively bar development of the
property for oil and gas production for the term of the agricultural lease.
Consequently, if the property the landowner proposes to lease for oil and
gas development is subject to an agricultural lease, it is advisable to obtain
a subrogation from the agricultural lessee to permit oil and gas operations.
It is generally possible to obtain the agreement of the agricultural lessee in
exchange for agreement to compensate the agricultural lessee for any
damages to his crops or interference with his operations by the mineral
lessee. If it is necessary for the landowner to agree jointly with the operator
to pay such compensation, he should secure an agreement of indemnifica-
tion from the operator.23 Where advance planning is possible, the problem
can be effectively avoided by inserting a clause in agricultural leases mak-
ing them specifically subject to future exercise of mineral rights.24
With respect to utility or access easements, the general principle of
law is that the owner of the burdened property may use it in any way not
inconsistent with the full enjoyment of the easement by its owner.25 Many
utility or access easements are so broadly worded as to bar expressly or by
implication all or most uses of the surface for oil and gas operations.
Operators are usually willing to work around such easements, however,
because they are quite commonly encountered. Thus, the landowner can be
protected simply by making the grant of the lease subject to existing
easements and rights of way.
22 As a general rule the mineral estate is regarded as dominant to the surface estate. Seethe
discussion at McMahon, Rights and Liabilities with Respect to Surface Usage by Mineral Lessees,
6th S.W. LEGAL FOUNDATION INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 231, 232 (1955). Thus,
unless the terms of the grant of an agricultural lease are so broad as to convey an exclusive right to
the surface, the senior agricultural lessee's interest ought to be subservient to the right of the junior
mineral interest lessee. It may be that the courts would interpret an agricultural lease this broadly
where the facts were that the two uses were totally incompatible. In the absence of extreme facts,
however, perhaps on the basis of the public policy in favor of energy development, one may expect
that the courts will merely require the mineral lessee to compensate the agricultural lessee for
damage suffered. See Republic Nat. Gas Co. v. Melson, 274 P.2d 543 (Okla. 1954); Magnolia Pet.
Co. v. Price, 86 Okla. 105, 206 P. 1033 (1922). See also the discussion at 1 KUNTZ. supra note 2, at
§ 9.2 and 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, at § 218.3.
23 Castleberry, Protecting the Oiland Gas Lessor, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 441, 451 (1958).
24 Id. Subrogation can be made more palatable for the agricultural lessee by providing that
the landowner will pay over to the agricultural lessee any damages for injury to growing crops
which are paid pursuant to a subsequent oil and gas lease.
25 3 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 405 (1949).
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The second problem which must be addressed in protecting the
landowner against interference with use of his land relates to what rights
are to be granted. Oil and gas development is the objective of the parties
when the lease form is presented. Yet, lease forms often purport to grant
the lessee rights to more than just the oil and gas under the premises. The
additional phraseology may refer to specific by-products of oil or gas, such
as asphaltum. Frequently, however, there will be general references to
"other hydrocarbons" or "other minerals." One might expect that such
inclusive language would be limited by the rule of ejusdem generis to
substances which are similar in nature to oil and gas and likely to be pro-
duced in conjunction with oil and gas operations.
A variety of unreconcilable positions have been taken bj courts-in
various jurisdictions with respect to the issue of what substances are in-
cluded in a lease with such general references. Some apply the ejusdem
generis as a rule of construction26 or look to the "four corners" of the in-
strument to ascertain the intent of the parties.27 Other courts reject the lat-
ter rule of construction and hold that the general reference is ambiguous
and must be interpreted in light of all the extrinsic facts and circumstances
that may be relevant in determining the intention of the parties at the time
the lease was granted.28 These courts will look to such factors as the nature
of the lessee's business at the time the lease was given and the nature of
mineral development activities in the area at that time.29 Still others hold
that there is no ambiguity and give the general reference literal effect; thus,
coal would be included in the grant because it is an "other mineral." 0
The division of authority becomes a problem, however, only where
there is an ambiguity in the granting clause of the lease. Thus, the key to
representing the landowner in this respect is to determine and specify what
rights are to be granted. If the intention of the landowner is to limit the
lease to oil and gas operations, then the granting clause should so indicate;
a limitation to "oil, gas, and liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons, and other
minerals produced with oil and gas," or similar language might be ap-
propriate.
Closely related to the issue of what substances are to be produced
under the lease is the question of what land is to be subject to its coverage.
Because the commonly encountered metes and bounds descriptions of
agricultural or grazing land are often imprecise, many lease forms offered
26 Seee.g., Yunker's Co-Executors v. Mason, 284 S.W.2d 98 (Ky. 1955).
27 Vogel v. Cobb, 193 Okla. 64, 141 P.2d 276 (1943).
28 Besing v. Ohio Valley Coal Co., 155 Ind. App. 527, 293 N.E.2d 510 (1973).
29 For other factors that may be considered relevant, see the discussion at I WILLIAIS &
MEYERS, supra note 2, at § 219.5.
30 Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1973).
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by operators contain a "Mother Hubbard" or "cover all" clause designed
to protect the lessee against a disparity between the description of the pro-
perty in the lease and the actual boundaries of the tract.3 The clause was
developed to cure minor defects in legal descriptions by causing the inclu-
sion within the lease description of small strips of land contiguous to the
land leased which are owned by the landowner or to which the landowner
has claims by adverse possession. Where the Mother Hubbard clause is
broadly drafted and literally interpreted, however, it may be given the ef-
fect of including within the lease tracts of land or interests in land not con-
templated by the landowner.32
In the absence of a specific clause formulation and a specific fact
situation, it is difficult to suggest a modification of the Mother Hubbard
clause to protect the landowner. Sometimes the Mother Hubbard clause
may be deleted without detriment to the legitimate interest of the operator,
particularly if the description used in the lease is in terms of well-
established boundaries such as highways or tracts of land owned by other
persons. On other occasions, it may be appropriate to modify the clause by
limiting its application to tracts contiguous, adjacent to, or adjoining the
described land or by adding specific reference to tracts owned by the land-
owner which are not intended to be covered by the lease.
Once the landowner's lawyer has established what substances and
tracts of land are to be covered by the lease, his attention should turn to the
scope of the lessee's right to use the surface of the land incident to his
search for and development of oil and gas. It is well established that an oil
and gas lease gives the lessee the right by implication to use so much of the
surface of the land as is reasonably necessary for operations.3" Typically,
31 "A typical clause will follow the specific description of the land leased and will provide,
'It being intended to include herein all lands and interests therein contiguous to or appurtenant to
said described lands owned or claimed by lessor'," WILLIAMS & MEYERS, MANUAL OF TERMS,
supra note 5, at 96.
32 See, e.g., Holloway's Unknown Heirs v. Whatley, 133 Tex. 608, 610, 131 S.W.2d 89, 90
(1939), where the Mother Hubbard clause in a deed provided that, "If there is any other land
owned by me in Liberty County, Texas, or any land, the title to which stands in my name, it is
hereby conveyed, the intention of this instrument being to convey all land owned by me in said
County," and was held to cause the conveyance of 1/2 interest in the minerals previously reserved
by the grantor in other tracts of land in the same county. More generally, however, Mother Hub-
bard clauses are limited in language and disfavored by the courts. See generally McRae, Granting
Clauses in Oil and Gas Leases: Including Mother Hubbard Clauses, 2d S.W. LEGAL FOUNDATION
INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 43 (1951).
33 Otherwise, the owner of the mineral interest, the dominant estate, would be unable to
enjoy his estate. Wilcox Oil Co. v. Lawson, 341 P.2d 591 (Okla. 1959). See 1 WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, supra note 2, at § 218 and cases cited therein. See also 1 KUNTZ, supra note 2, at § 3.2
and cases cited therein.
34 For example, a lease form commonly used in Ohio provides in relevant part: "That the
said Lessor, in consideration of the sum of one dollar, the receipt of which is hereby acknowl-
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however, the granting clause of the oil and gas lease specifies at some
length surface uses permitted. 3' There is nothing objectionable about such
clauses so long as they are related to uses of the surface necessary to
development and marketing of the production from the leased land or
units with which the leased land is combined for production purposes.
However, the growth of "self-help" natural gas programs35 in many states
has led some independent operators to modify such clauses to provide that
the leased lands may be used for pipelines to gather and transport gas
without a restriction that the gas come from the leased land or from a drill-
ing or operating unit which includes the leased land. 6 Such clauses are un-
satisfactory from the viewpoint of both the landowner and the operator
and should not be accepted by the landowner's lawyer. The operator under
such a clause gets an easement that terminates with the lease when produc-
tion from the leased land ceases, which is probably insufficient for his
needs as wells on other lands may still be in production at that time. The
landowner, on the other hand, receives no additional compensation for
granting an easement unrelated to production from his land.
More generally, disputes between landowners and operators over use
of the surface of the land center not upon the nature of the uses permitted
but upon the location of those uses. It is in both parties' interest that the
wells be drilled and produced on the lands covered by the lease, but wells
drilled or equipment placed in the wrong location can substantially impede
the landowner's use of the land for agricultural or business operations.
edged, and of the covenants and agreements hereinafter contained, does hereby grant unto the
Lessee all of the oil and gas and/or the constituents of either, in and under the lands hereinafter
described, together with the exclusive rights to drill for, produce and market oil and gas and their
constituents and also the right to enter thereon at all times for the purpose of drilling and
operating for oil, gas and water, and for carrying on geophysical work, and to possess, use and oc-
cupy so much of said premises as is necessary and convenient in removing the above named pro-
ducts therefrom by pipe lines or otherwise for a term of ten (10) years and so much longer
thereafter as oil, gas, or their constituents are produced in paying quantities thereon, or operations
are maintained on all of that certain tract of land...."(Emphasis added.)
35 "Self-help" natural gas programs have been developed by public utilities commissions
in several states to establish guidelines under which industrial natural gas users subjected to cur-
tailments may develop resources within the state and transport gas through regulated pipelines to
their industrial plants. See, e.g., the orders of The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, dated
Oct. 18, 1973, Jan. 23, 1975, Oct. 31, 1975, Mar. 31, 1976, and Oct. 19, 1977. In re Development
of the Supply of Natural Gas Within the State of Ohio, Case No. 73-761-G. For a description of
the Ohio program, see Battaglia & Balthaser, Ohio Public Utilities Commission's Self-Help Pro-
gram-A Possible Solution to the Natural Gas Shortage Problem, 50 OHIo ST. B.A. REP. No. 5
(Jan. 31, 1977). Frequently, self-help programs involve the gathering and transportation of gas
from several properties through "feeder" pipelines to the public utility's metering station.
36 For example: "The first party grants the...right of way over and across said premises
together with the exclusive right to lay surface rights and pipes to operate this as well as adjoining
farms...."(Emphasis added.)
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From the landowner's perspective, the problem arises because the grant of
the right to use the surface for oil and gas operations is generally held to
carry with it the lessee's right to decide where to locate wells and associated
equipment." To the extent that the landowner is worried about in-
terference with present or intended uses of his property from the location
of surface uses in oil and gas operations, it is usually possible to negotiate a
modification to the granting clause of the lease limiting the location of
wells, equipment, access roads, and pipelines to specific areas or providing
that they are to be determined by the operator with the reasonable consent
of the landowner.3 8 Further protection can be obtained by requiring that
pipelines be buried below plow depth and that well sites and other equip-
ment be fenced for the protection of livestock.39
The final concern of landowners with respect to interference from oil
and gas operations with their use of the land pertains to the operator's
right to use water in drilling or producing operations. The law as to the
operator's right in this area is so vague that it is in the interest of both par-
ties to the lease that the lease specifically address the subject.4' However, it
may be important to the landowner that the issue not be determined by
"boiler plate" terms in the operator's lease form.4' In areas where water is
in short supply and must be relied upon for irrigation or other intensive use
on the surface, it will be important for the landowner to limit the lessee's
right to water. This can be accomplished either by providing that the lessee
shall not use fresh water in such amounts as to interfere with the normal
flow or supply of water for the lessor's use, or by reserving all fresh water
to the lessor. Likewise, in arid areas it may be advisable to include in the
lease a clause permitting the landowner to take over nonproducing oil or
37 See 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, at § 218.8 and cases cited therein.
38 For example: "Provided, however, that the lessor shall consent in writing to the location
of any wells, equipment, access roads, pipelines or other structures placed upon the subject pro-
perty, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld." Note that it would probably be unwise
to provide that "the location of any wells, equipment, access roads, pipelines or other structures
placed upon the property shall be determined by mutual agreement of the lessor and lessee"
because of the risk that a court might interpret such language as an unenforceable agreement to
agree.
39 For example: "The lessee shall bury below plow depth all pipelines used to conduct oil
and gas to and off the premises. Lessee shall fence all pits, holes excavations and equipment loca-
tions sufficiently to safeguard livestock which may be on said land."
40 See generally Losee, Legal Problems of a Water Supply for the Oil and Gas Industry,
20th S.W. LEGAL FOUNDATION INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 55 (1969). See also 1
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, at § 219.6, which contains an excellent summary of Oklahoma
cases dealing with this problem.
41 For example, the provision that "The lessee shall have the right of using sufficient oil,
gas and water for operating on the premises..." might make the landowner's right to water subor-
dinate to the needs of the operator.
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gas wells for conversion into water wells where water tables have been
discovered in the course of drilling operations. 2
In short, normally it is not difficult to protect the interest of the lan-
downer adequately against interference with his use of the surface by the
oil and gas lessee. The potential problems are often ignored by form leases,
however, and it is the function of the landowner's lawyer to foresee and
address those problems.
Insuring Fair Dealing By the Operator
The second major concern of the landowner negotiating an oil and
gas lease transaction is that he be protected insofar as is possible against a
lack of fair dealing by the lessee. Although an oil and gas lease does not
create a legal partnership, the economic relationship between the lessor and
his lessee approximates that of a partnership arrangement. 3 The primary
benefit to be realized for both the landowner and the operator is from the
exploration of the property and its development for production. Because
they contribute different kinds and proportions of assets to the venture and
because they have different shares in the profits of the venture,
landowners' and lessees' interests are not always consistent. Moreover,
because it is the lessee under the oil and gas lease who possesses within very
broad limitations the right to decide if, when, where, and under what cir-
cumstances to drill and operate,44 the position of the landowner is
42 Professor Castleberry suggests the following clause to achieve this: "Lessee shall note on
the log of any well drilled on said land all water-bearing strata, and shall immediately furnish
Lessor with a copy of said well log. Lessee shall, before removing any casing or tubing from any
non-producing well drilled on said land, notify Lessor in writing of his intention of doing so, and
if Lessor shall, within fifteen days after the receipt of such letter inform Lessee in writing of
Lessor's desire to convert such well into a water well, Lessee shall have in such well such amount of
casing and tubing as Lessor may desire for such purpose, provided such procedure is lawful and
will not violate any order or rule of any official, commission, agency, or authority then having
jurisdiction in or over such matters, and provided further that Lessor shall pay to Lessee-
- (-%) per cent of the original cost of such casing and tubing when delivered to Lessee on the
ground at the well site, such payment to be made within fifteen days after the receipt by Lessor of
Lessee's statement therefor. Castleberry, supra note 22, at 449.
43 Although the relationship between the lessor and lessee of an oil and gas lease has not
traditionally been viewed as a fiduciary relationship, fiduciary principles have been frequently ap-
plied under the guise of implied covenants or equity. E.g., Imes v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 184
Okla. 79, 84 P.2d 1106 (1938). Cf. Williams, The Fiduciary Principle in the Law of Oil and Gas,
13th S.W. LEGAL FOUNDATION INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 201, 215-31(1962).
44 In all jurisdictions but Indiana and Kentucky, it is held that the lessee under an "unless"
form lease has the sole discretion to determine if and when to drill a test well in the absence of off-
set drainage; no implied obligation to drill an initial well within the primary term is recognized. 2
SUMMERS, supra note 2, at § 397. As has been indicated above, location of wells and related equip-
ment is also considered to be a decision for the lessee. See note 37 and accompanying text, supra.
Likewise, once the property has been developed by the drilling of a test well, decisions as to how to
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analogous to that of a partner owning a limited partnership interest; he
shares the risk of the venture but has no voice in its management. Yet, the
typical oil and gas lease is bereft of clauses protecting the Iandowner
against a lack of fair dealing by the operator.45
A problem which frequently arises in this respect involves assignment
of the lease. Sometimes oil and gas leases are obtained from landowners by
an independent operator who intends to develop the property or, if the
lease is granted to one of the large oil companies, by a "landman" 46
employed by the oil company. However, in areas with marginal or as yet
unproven production, oil and gas leases often are taken by self-employed
landmen who make a living by acquiring oil and gas leases and then assign-
ing them to operating companies. The landman's anticipated profit may
not be from operations but from a mark-up on the lease transferred or
from an overriding royalty47 reserved in the assignment of the lease.
Deservedly or not, landmen have a reputation for veracity analogous to
that of used car salesmen. Conventions of farm organizations abound with
variations of the story of the landowner who granted an oil and gas lease
under the distinct impression that his property would be developed by a
specified oil company of sterling reputation, only to discover later that the
lease had been assigned to some other operator.
Under the terms of a typical form lease, the landowner is not pro-
tected against assignment of the lease to an undesirable lessee; in fact lease
forms usually specifically provide that the lessee may assign his interest. 8
Even in the absence of such a specific provision, the general rule of law is
operate existing wells and whether to drill additional wells are generally held within the operator's
purview, unless it is shown that the operator is not acting as a reasonably prudent operator or with
reasonable diligence.
45 In part because of the "one-sided" leases prepared by lessees' counsel, the courts have
developed various implied covenants to protect the lessors' interests. For a discussion of these im-
plied covenants, see the text accompanying and the authorities cited at notes 63-67 and 102-103
infra. One able commentator, in critiquing the various views as to the basis of implied covenants,
argues that implied covenants arise out of an attempt by the courts to promote their sense of
justice and fair dealing by measuring the lessee's conduct against that of the hypothetical prudent
operator. Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, Develop, and Market Under
Mineral Leases, 27th S.W. LEGAL FOUNDATION INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 177,
193-98 (1976).
46 A landman is an employee of an oil company whose primary duties are the management
of the company's relations with its landowners, including but not limited to the securing of oil and
gas leases. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS. MANUAL OF TERMS, supra note 5, at 239.
47 An overriding royalty is a share of the oil and gas produced, free of the expense of pro-
duction. It is distinguished from the landowner's royalty in that it is carved out of the lessee's
share of the oil and gas. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, MANUAL OF TERMS, supra note 5, at 275.
48 For example: "If the estate of either party hereto is assigned, and the privilege of assign-
ing in whole or in part is expressly allowed, the covenants hereof shall extend to their heirs, ex-
ecutors, administrators, successors or assigns...."
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that an assignment may be made unless it is specifically prohibited in the
lease.49 Moreover, the right to assign a lease is economically very important
to operators as it substantially increases the liquidity of their assets and
potentially enhances operating efficiency by permitting them to concen-
trate operations in a particular area. Despite the advantages to the lessee of
free assignability, it may be possible for the lawyer representing the lan-
downer to negotiate a modification of the assignment clause of the lease to
provide that it shall not be assigned without permission of the landowner,"
or by limiting the right of assignment to that necessary to secure develop-
ment of the lease by the named lessee.5 At the very least, counsel represen-
ting the landowner should insist that the lessee named in the lease be the
person or company whom it has been represented will develop the lease,
rather than the name of the individual who has negotiated its terms. Such
insistence will either force the landman to divulge his intentions if he con-
templates assignment to someone other than the operator whom it has been
represented will develop the lease, or lay the ground for a claim of fraud in
the inducement. 2
Other problems relating to fair dealing between the parties usually do
not arise until after development of the property under lease has begun.
The most common of these is the issue of responsibility for damages to the
premises and cleanup of drilling sites. Drilling for oil and gas is a messy
and dirty business. Access roads have to be built and sites for the drilling
and operating equipment have to be gouged out. Drilling operations in-
49 The lessee's right of assignment is inherent, in the absence of express prohibition. 2
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, at § 402. Leases on federal, state, or Indian lands may not be
assignable as a consequence of statutes governing their disposition and use. 3 SuMMERS, supra
note 2, at § 541.
50 Because of the danger that such a restriction would be held to authorize the landowner's
refusal for any reason or no reason at all, this restriction is unlikely to be acceptable to a potential
lessee, and probably need not be insisted upon by the landowner.
51 See, e.g., the clause upheld by the Supreme Court of Texas in Knight v. Chicago Corp.,
144 Tex. 98, 188 S.W.2d 564 (1945), which modified the assignment provisions of the lease by pro-
viding that, "the lessee, its successors or assigns, shall not make any assignments of undivided in-
terests, overriding royalties or oil payments without the written consent of the Lessors, save and
except assignments to banks and oil well supply companies for the purpose of obtaining money,
supplies, and equipment to operate and develop the leased premises." Id. at 565.
52 If relied on by the lessor, a lessee's representation that he personally would develop the
leasehold could form the basis for an action for rescission on the grounds of fraud. See generally,
8A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, § 4465 (repl. 1963).
Such facts may be difficult to prove. See Lane v. Urbahn, 246 S.W. 1070 (Tex. Ct. App. 1922),
modified 265 S.W. 1063 (Tex. Ct. App. 1924), reh. denied, 289 S.W. 173 (Tex. Ct. App. 1926)
judgment rendered; Gillespie v. Fulton Oil & Gas Co. 236 II. 188, 86 N.E. 219 (1908). However,
even if the cause of action were proved, as this fraud relates to the inducement rather than the ex-
ecution of the lease, a bona fide assignee would be protected. See Parker v. King, 235 Miss. 80,
108 So. 2d 224 (1959).
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evitably produce considerable dust, mud, and noise. Small amounts of oil
are spilled in the course of operations. Although these problems are usually
more of an irritant than an impediment to the use and enjoyment of the
land, what the operator does or does not do to meet those problems is like-
ly to color the landowner's perception of the whole leasing transaction.
While oil and gas leases typically provide for payment of damages to
growing crops,53 such a limited clause will not protect the landowner
against financial loss which may result without the destruction of growing
crops and which may continue from year to year, e.g., if a well is located in
the middle of a cultivated field, the well site and its access road will not be
available to the landowner for cultivation for the life of the well. Although
the use of well sites and access roads by the lessee is included in the grant of
the lease either by implication or by specific provision,54 it is common for
operators voluntarily to pay "site damages" in a lump sum for damage to
the terrain and loss of productive capacity. Obviously, however, it is
preferable from the viewpoint of the landowner to make provision for such
payments in the lease. Likewise, although most operators make a
reasonable effort to clean up and restore the surface of the land after drill-
ing and producing operations are completed, the common law generally
recognizes no clear obligation to do so." Although cleanup and restoration
are required by statute in some states,56 the landowner's case is strength-
ened if the requirement is included as a lease obligation of the operator.
With an express provision, there can be no dispute as to the existence of the
duty or to the right of the landowner to enforce it.
Another problem raising the issue of fair dealing is payment of
royalties. A common suspicion among landowners is that their operators
are holding back in the payment of royalties due, either by understating
production or by overstating the expenses to which thelandowner is sub-
53 For example: "Lessee shall pay for damages caused by lessee's operations to growing
crops on said land. Said damage, if not mutually agreed upon, is to be ascertained and determined
by three disinterested persons, one thereof to be appointed by the lessor, one by the lessee, and a
third by the two so appointed, and the award of such three persons shall be final and conclusive."
54 See the discussion accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
55 The common law restoration remedies that a landowner has available are basically an
excessive use of a surface easement, nuisance, and negligence. E.g., Lanahan v. Myers, 389 P.2d
92 (Okla. 1964) (holding a lessee liable for excessive use of the surface). The reported cases are few
and contradictory, usually being decided on their facts. See generally I WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
supra note 2, at §§ 218.8-.12; Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 1356 (1959). It has also been proposed that
there should be an implied obligation of restoration in oil and gas leases. SeeSmith v. Schuster, 66
So. 2d 430 (La. Ct. App. 1933). See also Note, Oil and Gas: Does the Oil and Gas Lessee Have a
Duty to Restore the Surface?, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 572 (1972).
56 See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.072 (Page Supp. 1976).
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ject.57 The common law recognizes the right of the landowner to an ac-
counting of production" and some states have statutes requiring the
operator or companies purchasing the oil or gas to make available the in-
formation necessary for the landowner to evaluate the adequacy of the
royalties received. 9 The procedures for enforcing either the common law
or a statutory right, however, are likely to be more cumbersome than those
for enforcing a lease clause and additionally a benefit is realized by putting
the operator on notice during the lease negotiation that accurate account-
ing information will be required by the landowner. Therefore, a clause in
the lease permitting the landowner and his agents reasonable access to the
books and records of the operator is recommended.
Yet another post-development problem of fair dealing between the
operator and landowner arises when a producing gas well which has been
supplying gas to the landowner's residence and agricultural operations is
determined by the operator to be no longer economically viable and plans
are made to abandon it.' If such a well is the only producing well on the
property, plugging it will cut off the landowner's source of gas. Although
the well may not be capable of producing in paying quantities in that its
production can no longer cover the operator's costs of operation, it may be
capable of meeting the landowner's needs for many years. Furthermore, if
the landowner loses the supply of gas from the well, he may be unable to
secure another source because of public utility regulations barring the ex-
tension of new gas service.6 This might seem a situation in which it would
be logical for the lessor to buy out the interest of the lessee in the well so
that the lessor might continue production himself. However, if there is a
severe shortage of pipe and equipment, as is periodically the case, the
57 Typically, oil and gas leases provide that the landowner's royalty is to be paid "at the
wellhead" and "free of the cost of production," or other similar language. The royalty interest
owner is obligated to pay his proportionate share of the costs incurred subsequent to production.
For a discussion of what kinds of costs may be found to arise subsequent to production and,
therefore, to be shared by the operator and the landowner, see 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note
2, at §§ 645-645.3. See also 3 KUNTZ, supra note 2, at § 42.2.
58 The courts have held that if the rent or royalty reserved in the leasing of mineral proper-
ty is dependent upon the amount of mineral taken, a bill in equity will lie to compel an accounting
by the operators or lessees. SeeSwearingen v. Stears, 49 W. Va. 312, 38 S.E. 510 (1901). See also
Harleston v. West Louisiana Bank, 129 Miss. 111, 91 So. 423 (1922); Hurwitz v. Carolina Sand &
Gravel Co., 189 N.C. 1, 126 S.E. 171 (1925); Withington v. Gypsy Oil Co., 68 Okla. 138, 172 P.
634 (1918).
59 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.30 (Page Supp. 1976).
60 Note, however, that there are limits upon the right of the operator to make such a deter-
mination. Where the well is clearly capable of paying production, the operator may not withdraw
the casing and plug the well because that would destroy the well. Patton v. Rogers, 417 S.W.2d 470
(Tex. Ct. App. 1967).
61 See, e.g., Interim Supplemental Emergency Order of the Public Utilities Commission of
Ohio, Case No. 71 -757-G, June 23, 1972.
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operator may be unwilling to sell the pipe and equipment at what the
landowner regards as a reasonable price. Indeed, the operator may be un-
willing to sell at any price; he may wish to use the equipment and casing in
his own operations. Thus, if gas from producing wells on the landowner's
land is likely to be important to the landowner's operations, counsel
should include in the lease or in a separate agreement an option permitting
the landowner to buy the equipment and pipe on wells drilled on his land at
stated or formula-determined prices when the operator determines that
those wells should be abandoned."
Another, and final, matter relating to fair dealing between the
operator and landowner concerns the obligation of the operator to comply
with covenants implied in oil and gas leases. Oil and gas are fugacious, that
is, they tend to migrate to areas of lesser pressure. Thus, oil and gas may be
drawn from under one tract of land to a bore hole located on a nearby tract
of land. All states recognize that the landowner's interest in the oil and gas
under his property is subject to divestment if the oil or gas is first "cap-
tured" and produced by another." To protect the landowner against such
drainage, the law imposes an implied duty on the operator to drill an "off-
set" well" if the reasonable, prudent operator would do so.6  In other
words, if the landowner can show that it is more probable than not that a
well drilled on his property to offset a well drilled on a separately owned
adjacent tract would produce oil and/or gas in sufficient quantities to
repay the cost of drilling, equipping and operating that well, and to pay a
reasonable profit on those expenditures, then the law recognizes an obliga-
tion on the part of the operator to drill the offset well to protect the lessor's
interest." In addition, most courts recognize that the lessee, after drilling
an initial well on the leased premises, has an obligation to continue ex-
62 A clause drafted similarly to that set forth at note 42 supra would be appropriate.
63 1 KUNTZ, supra note 2, at § 4.2 and cases cited therein. See also 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
supra note 2, at § 204.4; 1 SUMMERS, supra note 2, at § 61.
64 An offset well is a well drilled on one tract of land to prevent the drainage of oil or gas to
an adjoining tract of land on which a well is being drilled or is already in production. WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, MANUAL OF TERMS, supra note 5, at 383.
65 North American Pet. Co. v. Knight, 321 P.2d 964 (Okla. 1958). The duty to drill an off-
set well is sometimes referred to as the implied covenant to protect the leased premises against
drainage. See I BROWN, supra note 2, at § 16.02(5). See also5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2,
at § § 821-26.3. Although there has been debate as to whether implied covenants are implied in fact
or in law (compare Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease
in Texas, 11 TEX. L. REV. 399, 402-406 (1933), with M. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND
GAS LEASES § 7,220 (2d ed. 1940), and Kuntz, Professor Merrill's Contribution to Oil and Gas
Law, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 484 (1972)), there is substantial agreement that they are rooted in the con-
tract principle of cooperation. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, at § 802.1.
66 North American Pet. Co. v. Knight, 321 P.2d 964 (Okla. 1958). See also 2 BROWN,
supra note 2, at § 16.02(5)(d).
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ploration and development if a prudent operator would do so. 67 Some
operators seek to avoid these implied obligations by disclaiming the im-
plied covenants in the lease.68 From the landowner's standpoint, abroga-
tion or limitation is unacceptable and may indicate that the operator in-
tends to act in less than good faith toward him. Any lease form offered
should be carefully scrutinized by the landowner's lawyer to insure that
such disclaimers are not buried somewhere in the verbiage.
In summary, the steps which should be taken by the lessor's lawyer to
insure that the lessee deals fairly with his client are primarily defensive in
nature. Frequently, however, negotiation of such provisions in the lease
will also have a prophylactic effect in that the discussion will reveal to the
landowner the true character of the would-be lessee and the nature of his
intentions toward the leased land. Moreover, a "quality" operator is
unlikely to be offended by the suggestion that the lease be modified to pro-
tect the landowner, for he is being asked to do nothing he did not other-
wise intend to do.
Maximizing the Landowner's Return
The third major concern of the landowner contemplating oil and gas
leasing is that he maximize his return on the transaction. Because leasing is
a business transaction, the landowner naturally feels that he ought to ob-
tain "top dollar" for his lease or, at the least, that he should receive terms
as favorable as those received by anyone else in the area. Counsel for
landowners can promote profit maximization for their clients by flexibly
negotiating the various lease clauses which may be of economic benefit to
the landowner.
The most frequent complaint among landowners is that the royalty
offered them is insufficient. By custom, the royalty, the share of the pro-
duction reserved by the landowner for permitting another to develop his
land for oil and gas, is 1/8 of the gross production, except in some western
states where it may be 1/6.69 With the rapid rise in wellhead prices of oil
67 Producers Pipe & Supply Co. v. James, 332 P.2d 958 (Okla. 1958); Fox Pet. v. Booker,
123 Okla. 276, 253 P. 33 (1926). See also 2 BROWN, supra note 2, at § 16.02(2); 5 WILLIAMS &
MEYERs, supra note 2, at § § 831-47.
68 If, as most courts have held, implied covenants are implied in fact, then they may be
negated where that is the intention of the parties. Courts have tended to view disclaimers, par-
ticularly those tucked away in the "boilerplate" clauses, unfavorably and have construed them
strictly. See the discussion at 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, at §§ 826-26.1, 835-35.3.
Clauses specifically disclaiming one or all of the implied covenants would probably be given effect,
however.
69 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, at § 304.11.
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and gas over the past several years,7" one might expect that the market
would bear an increase in the customary royalty. Yet, no such trend is ap-
parent. This may be attributable in part to the deep roots of the custom
and the prevailing consensus among operators that oil and gas exploration
and development is a risky business and that those engaged in it should
receive the major portion of any increase in market price. Furthermore, in
recent years there have been substantial increases in the costs of drilling
and operating, although such costs have probably not increased as much as
the market price for oil and gas produced.7' Resistance to increases in
royalty percentage may also be attributed to fear on the part of operators
that by agreeing to a larger royalty in the lease (an agreement which will go
on public record), they will open the floodgates with respect to royalties
that must be paid on other leases which they must obtain or renew. For
whatever reasons, the lawyer for the landowner is likely to find it difficult
to negotiate more than the "standard" royalty for the area in which the
land is located. This is not to say that the practitioner should not pursue
such negotiations or that he will not succeed, but he should be prepared for
strong resistance and ought to consider trading his demands for a higher
royalty for a benefit of some other type.
The obvious trade-off is an increased bonus for granting the lease.
Since 1975, it has not been permissible under federal tax law for
landowners to claim percentage depletion treatment for lease bonus
payments." The lease bonus is cash in hand, however, and may be struc-
tured in the appropriate situation on an installment payment basis to
minimize the impact of taxes.73 If the land to be leased is located in an area
evidencing a high probability of good commercial production, the operator
will normally expect to pay some lease bonus, and it is probably fair to say
that the frequency and size of lease bonuses has increased as the market
price of oil and gas has risen.
70 Between 1973 and 1976, domestic average crude oil prices increased from $3.89 per bar-
rel of oil to $8.18 per barrel of oil. Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States
Senate, "Regulation of Domestic Crude Oil Prices," 53 (Publication Number 95-8, Mar. 1977).
71 The average cost per foot drilled in the United States increased from $20.76 per foot in
1972 to $28.93 per foot in 1974 (over 40%). Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1976, page
713.
72 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.613A-7(f)(1). The lease bonus is, however, subject to cost
depletion in those rare situations where the lessor has an identifiable cost basis attributable to the
oil and gas in place. See Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(a)(1) (1965), for the formula used in computing cost
depletion on a lease bonus. However, royalty payments generally will qualify. See I.R.C. § 613A.
Oil and gas taxation is a complex subject beyond the scope of this article. A good general source is
C. BREEDING, F. BURKE & A. BURTON, INCOME TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES (1977).
73 Securely establishing the right to installment reporting under I.R.C. § 453 is difficult.
See the discussion at BREEDING, BURKE & BURTON, supra note 72, at 4.08. The statute and its
regulation should be reviewed carefully before attempting such a transaction.
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There are less obvious trade offs for the demand for increased
royalties. One is the inclusion of a "free gas" clause if the lease offered
does not contain one, or for a high or unlimited usage if the free gas clause
is already included. 74 The free use of gas from wells on the premises is
presently of substantial economic value to the landowner, and the value is
increased by the fact that it is not generally treated as being subject to in-
come taxation. 7' A free gas clause should be relatively easy to negotiate;
operators will often agree even to provide and install the equipment and
material to effect the hookup for delivery and use of the free gas. Another
possibility for a trade-off in lieu of an increased royalty is a separate agree-
ment providing for the payment of specified annual rentals for the use of
sites for wells, tank batteries, and other equipment. 76 Alternatively, the
landowner might be paid a fee for watching over well sites and equipment
located on his land. Finally, a tradeoff may take the form of an indemnity
against related liabilities or expenses; for example, the operator may agree
to pay the landowner for any severance taxes or for increases in property
taxes or insurance premiums that may result from development of the
landowner's property for oil and gas production.
The point being made is that although operators are loathe to depart
from the royalty "customary" in the area, there are many other features of
the lease agreement that may be of significant economic value to the
landowner which may be easier to negotiate than an increased royalty. This
is particularly true if those agreements can be contained in an unrecorded
document separate from the oil and gas lease so that they do not "haunt"
the operator in negotiations with other landowners in the same area.
The landowner's second most common concern relating to maximiz-
ing his return under an oil and gas lease is the length of the term of the lease
74 A typical "free gas" clause might provide that: "Lessor may lay a line to any gas well on
said lands and take gas produced from said well for use for light and heat in one dwelling house on
said land, at lessor's own risk, subject to the use and the right of abandonment of the well by the
lessee. The first 200,000 cubic feet of gas taken in each year shall be free of cost, but all gas in ex-
cess of 200, 000 cubic feet of gas taken in each year shall be paid for at the current published rates
in the town nearest the premises above described and the measurements and regulations shall be by
meter and regulators set at lessor's cost at the tap on the line." Obviously, it would be to the
landowner's advantage if the use of free gas were not limited to "one dwelling house" or to a max-
imum of 200,000 cubic feet per year.
75 Gas used on the producing property for fuel does not represent a sale and, hence, does
not result in any addition to gross income. The Roundup Coal Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 20
T.C. 388 (1953). However, if the gas is transported away from the producing property and is used
for fuel or in a plant or refinery on another property belonging to the taxpayer, the value of the gas
may be included in gross income for depletion purposes and, therefore, for tax purposes. Treas.
Reg. § 1.613-3(a) (1977).
76 Provision in the lease form for site rentals is likely to be the functional economic
equivalent of the liquidated site damages discussed in the text accompanying note 55, supra.
Therefore, one should not expect to be able to negotiate both for the landowner client.
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and the circumstances which will cause the lease to terminate. Despite the
attractiveness of lease bonuses and other financial devices, the primary
economic advantage to be gained by the landowner from the development
of his property for oil and gas is in the payment of royalties. Thus, the
landowner is primarily concerned that the operator to whom he gives a
lease develop the property promptly and, if development is not prompt,
that the lease be terminated so that another lease can be granted to an
operator who will perform.
The term of an oil and gas lease is set by the "habendum" or "term"
clause," and is divided into two parts. The first part, called the "primary
term," is a stated period of time, e.g., five, ten, or fifteen years. The
primary term is sometimes referred to as the exploratory period and is
designed to permit the lessee a reasonable time to conduct operations
leading to the discovery of oil and gas. The primary term is modified by a
rental clause which provides that "delay rentals" 78 are to be paid if an ex-
ploratory well is not drilled before the end of the first year of the lease.
Thus, the operator is given an economic incentive to expedite exploratory
operations thereby avoiding the payment of delay rentals. If, during the
primary term, exploratory activity conducted by the operator indicates that
oil or gas is not present beneath the leased tract in quantities sufficient to
justify production, the lessee may allow the lease to terminate by failing to
pay delay rentals or surrender the lease by executing a release.
As it is impossible to predict with precision the time span in which
production from a given tract of land will be economically justified and
because the operator needs protection for the substantial investment
necessary to develop the premises, the secondary term of the habendum
clause is of indefinite duration, for "so long thereafter as oil and gas is
produced." Some courts considering the question have interpreted the
word "produced" as shorthand for "produced in paying quantities to the
lessee." 79 In such states, the effect of the "thereafter" part of the haben-
77 The "habendum" or "term" clause of the lease sets forth the duration of the grantee's
interest in the premises. The habendum clause in a typical "unless" lease form provides: "Subject
to the other provisions herein contained, this lease shall be for a primary term of ..... years from
this date and for as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced from the above described land or from
land pooled with all or any part thereof."
78 See the discussion accompanying notes 5-6, supra.
79 McLeon v. Wells, 207 Ark. 303, 180 S.W.2d 325 (1944); Berthelote v. Loy Oil Co., 95
Mont. 434, 28 P.2d 187 (1933); Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh, 121 Okla. 135, 248 P. 329 (1926); Clifton
v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959). The apparent reason for such a rule is that "the
lessors should not be required to suffer a continuation of the lease after the expiration of the
primary term merely for speculation purposes on the part of the lessee." Garcia v. King, 139 Tex.
578, 585, 164 S.W.2d 509, 513 (1942). The term 'paying quantities' when used in the extension
clause of an oil lease habendum clause, means production in quantities sufficient to yield a return
in excess of operating cost, even though drilling and equipment costs may never be repaid...."
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dum clause is to extend the life of the lease to the limits of the economic
viability of production to the lessee. In contrast, other courts, particularly
those which first addressed the issue in the early part of the century, have
held that maintaining the lease during the secondary term only requires
production sufficient to generate a royalty adequate to compensate the
lessor for occupancy and interference resulting from lease operations."0
This has been applied so that the production required is less than "paying
quantities."'" Because the higher standard impedes speculation by the
lessee,82 it is recommended that counsel to the landowner add the words
"in paying quantities to the lessee" if there is any question in the jurisdic-
tion in which he practices as to the meaning of "produced" as used in the
habendum clause.
Negotiations between landowners and operators as to the content of
the habendum clause tend to focus on the length of the primary term.
Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. at 91, 325 S.W.2d at 692. The lease does not terminate as soon as the
well begins to operate at a loss:" there can be no limit as to time, whether it be days, weeks, or
months to be taken into consideration...." Id. at 88, 325 S.W.2d at 690. "ITIhe standard by which
paying quantities is determined is whether or not under all the relevant circumstances a reasonably
prudent operator would, for the purpose of making a profit and not merely for speculation, con-
tinue to operate a well in the manner in which the well in question was operated." Id. at 89, 325
S.W.2d at 691.
80 Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Co., 260 II1. 169, 102 N.E. 1043 (1913); Enfield v. Woods, 198 Ky.
328, 248 S.W. 842 (1923); McGraw Oil & Gas Co. v. Kennedy, 65 W. Va. 595, 64 S. E. 1027
(1909).
81 Enfield v. Woods, 198 Ky. 328, 248 S.W. 842 (1923). The action involved a suit to cancel
an oil and gas lease because there was no production to extend the lease into the secondary term.
The lease could be extended "as long thereafter as oil and gas, or either, is produced therefrom by
the lessees, or either of them, their successors and assigns." The court interpreted this language
and held for the lessor, but stated the principle that, "lilt will be observed that the lessee is not re-
quired to produce oil in paying quantities, but he is required to produce oil or gas, one or the
other, from the premises. This, of course, means a production of oil or gas in such quantities as to
be susceptible of division, so as to pay the landowner a royalty, even though small. A mere show-
ing of oil manifestly is not sufficient, even though produced. The production must be tangible and
substantial, but it need not be great." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 843. This rule was reaffirmed in
United States v. 2,847.58 Acres of Land, More or Less, 529 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1976), which stated
that the standard for production in "paying quantities" in Kentucky is that oil must be "produced
in sufficient quantities to be susceptible of division and provide the lessor with royalties large
enough to compensate for the inconvenience of the lessee's occupancy and operations." Id. at
690.
82 The element of speculation referred to arises when the lessee wants to hold the lease,
although diminished expectations on the partially developed tract result in an inability to justify
substantial expenditures for reworking the existing wells or drilling new wells. In the short run of
several years, it may be advantageous for the operator to continue operating the existing wells at a
loss. If prices for oil and gas increase appreciably or if other development in the area changes the
probability of drilling success, then the undrilled portion of the lease will be a part of the
operator's inventory of well sites. If not, then the lease has been held in force without the expen-
diture of large amounts of money.
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There is no standard duration. Operators typically prefer to make the
primary term as long as the lessor will allow so as to provide themselves
ample opportunity to decide whether to drill on the leased property and to
make the necessary arrangements for financing and equipment. From the
landowner's viewpoint, however, a short primary term is to be preferred in
order to obviate the possibility that the operator will speculate on rising
prices for the production; the landowner generally prefers to receive
royalties now, rather than to await the possibility of a marginally higher
royalty in the future. Obviously, compromise in the parties' positions is re-
quired.83 In very active areas of production it is not unusual to see leases
with terms of a few months to a year. More generally, however, primary
terms of one to ten years are found.84
A secondary concern with the habendum clause relates to the timing
of the lease termination during the primary term if the operator fails to live
up to his obligations. Generally, there are two "polar" types of oil and gas
leases in use in theUnited States. The more common is the so-called
"unless" lease in which the primary term provided for by the habendum
clause is modified by words to the effect that the lease will terminate one
year after it is given unless a well is commenced prior to that time or delay
rentals are paid for the privilege of deferring the commencement of opera-
tions.8" Under an "unless" lease, if the operator fails to meet the re-
quirements set for drilling or payment, the lease automatically
terminates,"' even though the failure of the operator may be due to clerical
83 For example, the lessee may be willing to pay and the landowner willing to accept higher
delay rentals or a larger bonus for a longer primary term. Delay rentals are treated as ordinary in-
come to the landowner for the purpose of federal income taxation and are not entitled to the
percentage depletion allowance. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(c)(2) (1965).
84 See 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, at § 601.4; 2 SUMMERS, supra note 2, at § 292.
85 A delay rental clause from a typical "unless" lease provides: "If operations for the
drilling of a well for oil or gas are not commenced or if there is no oil or gas being produced on
said land or on land pooled with all or any part thereof as hereinafter provided on or before one
year from the date hereof, this lease shall terminate as to both parties, unless the lessee on or
before that date shall pay or tender to the lessor or to the lessor's credit in the ......... bank at ......
or its successors, which shall continue as the depository for rental regardless of changes in the
ownership of said land, the sum of ....... dollars (S ..... ) which shall operate as a rental and cover the
privilege of deferring the commencement of operations for drilling of a well for twelve months
from said date...." (Emphasis added.)
86 In a few cases, where the failure to make the payment was due to the mistake of an in-
dependent agency rather than an agent or employee of the lessee, courts have refused to find
automatic termination on equitable grounds. See, e.g., Ballard v. Miller, 87 N.M. 86, 529 P.2d
752 (1974) (check timely tendered but lost in mail); Brazell v. Soucek, 130 Okla. 204, 266 P. 442
(1928) (cashier in depository bank failed to deposit); Oldfield v. Gypsy Oil & Gas Co., 123 Okla.
293, 253 P. 298 (1926) (postal clerk delivered to wrong bank although the draft was properly ad-
dressed).
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error,8 7 personal illness," or good faith mistake as to the due date;88 the
language of the lease is literally interpreted by the courts.
9
0
The second and less common type of lease is the "or" lease, which
typically provides that the operator will drill within one year or do
something else, such as pay rentals or surrender the lease.9 Such a clause
creates a leasehold interest which does not terminate automatically upon
the operator's failure to perform; rather it gives the landowner the right to
sue to recover past due delay rentals or to declare the lease forfeited (if the
lease contains a forfeiture clause).92 Thus, the basic difference between the
"unless" lease and the "or" lease is whether the operator's failure to drill
a well or pay delay rentals when due results in automatic forfeiture of his
interest. 93
The distinction between the "unless" lease form and the "or" lease
form is blurred somewhat by the increasing use, at least in the midwestern
states, of the "unless" form in conjunction with a notice requirement.
Such clauses contain language to the effect that failure to pay the rental as
required will not cause the lease to terminate until the operator has been
given a specified period of notice in writing of the failure and payment has
not been made within that period.94 It may seem surprising that such
87 Phillips Pet. Co. v. Curtis, 182 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1950) (applying Oklahoma law)
(lessee's clerk misinterpreted records, believing the lease to be producing); Young v. Jones, 222
S.W. 691 (Tex. Ct. App. 1920) (lessee's tender was $2.96 short).
88 Ford v. Barton, 224 S.W. 268 (Tex. Ct. App. 1920) (rentals tendered six days late due to
lessee's absence because of serious illness in family).
89 Greer v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 200 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1952) (applying New Mexico
law) (lessee's late tender due to mistaken belief that rentals due on anniversary of delivery of lease
rather than execution of lease).
90 Typically, the reasoning of the courts is that the "unless" lease form creates a deter-
minable property interest so that termination of the lease is not a forfeiture subject to suspension
on the basis of equitable principles, but the "automatic" ending of an estate. See, e.g., Phillips
Pet. Co. v. Curtis, 182 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1950).
91 For example: "Lessees agree to commence a well on said premises within.. .years from
the date hereof, or pay lessor...cents an acre per annum, payable quarterly in advance from the
...day of...,19.., until said well is commenced or this lease surrendered...." Broyles v. Gilman, 222
S.W. 685 (Tex. Ct. App. 1920) errorref'd.
92 See, e.g., Pure Oil Co. v. Sturm, 43 Ohio App. 105, 182 N.E. 875 (1930); Cohn v.
Clark, 48 Okla. 500, 150 P. 467 (1915).
93 The practical impact of the difference tends to be mitigated by the use of forfeiture
clauses in "or" leases and by the need for landowners to clear title where an "unless" lease has
been used. In either event, a formal act by the landowner is necessary before another lease can be
given.
94 For example, the following clause sometimes appears in leases used in Ohio: "Lessee to
commence a well on said premises within...from this date or pay to Lessor... Dollars ($...) each
year, payable quarterly thereafter until said well is commenced or this lease surrendered; but the
completion of a well upon said lands unproductive of oil or gas in paying quantities shall be con-
sidered as the equivalent of and regarded as the tender of delay rentals for a period of one year
thereafter. This lease shall become null and void for failure to pay rental for any period when same
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language does not render the leases voidable for want of mutuality,95 but
the courts have generally upheld them.96 From the landowner's point of
view, this modified form of the "unless" lease presents the worst of both
worlds. The landowner may well find himself in the position of periodical-
ly having to trace the operator in order to demand that delay rentals be
paid. If the landowner omits to make the demand for a substantial period
of time, or if he cannot locate the operator for a substantial period of time,
the operator is placed in the enviable position of being able to choose with
retroactive effect whether he wishes to continue the lease or not. If he
chooses to pay the past due delay rentals, then the lease continues. If he
elects not to pay them, then the lease is held to have terminated effective
the date the rentals were due, leaving the landowner without compensation
for the intervening time period. As a matter of principle, lawyers represen-
ting landowners should strenuously object to such modification of the
habendum clauses in "unless" leases.
A variation of the problem being discussed is presented after the
initial development of the lease when the operator fails to pay to the land-
owner the royalty provided for by the lease. Except in Louisiana,97 courts
have been reluctant to declare lease terminations for failure to pay royalties
when due.9 8 As a result, the landowner will usually find that his only prac-
becomes due and payable, provided however that lessee or his assigns is given 10 days written
notice of his failure to pay said rentals and they are not paid within said 10 days." (Emphasis add-
ed.) The clause may have resulted from a suggestion made in McElroy, Unless v. Or: An
Appraisal, 6 BAYLOR L. REv. 415, 427-28 (1954).
95 If the performance of a promise is entirely optional with the promisor, the promise is
said to be illusory, with the result that the entire agreement fails for want of consideration. See
Corbin, The Effect of Options on Consideration, 34 YALE L.J. 571 (1925) and Patterson, Illusory
Promises and Promisors' Options, 6 IOWA L. BULL. 129 (1920). Where courts have refused to give
effect to language requiring notice of failure to pay delay rentals they have done so on the basis
that the clauses are "inconsistent" and "repugnant" [Clovis v. Carson Oil & Gas Co., 11 F. Supp.
797, 798 (E.D. Mich. 1935)], "irreconcilable" [McDaniel v. Hager-Stevenson Oil Co., 75 Mont.
356, 368, 243 P. 582, 586 (1926)], or "in conflict" [Lewis v. Grininger, 198 Okla. 419, 420, 179
P.2d 463,464 (1947)], rather than on the basis of failure of consideration.
96 Wooley v. Standard Oil Co., 230 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1956); Dietrich v. Davis, -La.-,246
So. 2d 710 (Ct. App. 1971) (sand and gravel lease). Cf. Mossgrove v. All States Oil & Producing
Co., 24 Ohio App. 2d 128, 265 N.E.2d 299 (1970) ("or" form lease). Professors Williams and
Meyers conclude that a notice and demand provision specifically applicable to delay rentals should
be given effect by the courts because of the parties' intent to contract against automatic termina-
tion. 4 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, at § 682.2
97 See, e.g., Bouterie v. Kleinpeter, 258 La. 605, 247 So. 2d 548 (Ct. App. 1971). The right
of forfeiture does not arise in every case. See the discussion of "justifiable reasons" for which
cancellation of the lease may be refused at 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, at § 656.3
98 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, at § 656.3 Once the lessee has expended the time and
money to develop a lease, a possibility of unjust enrichment arises if the remedy of cancellation is
permitted. See generally Cannon v. Cassidy, 542 P.2d 514 (Okla. 1975); Morris v. First Nat'l
Bank, 249 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Ct. App. 1952); Castle Brook Carbon Black Co. v. Ferrell, 76 W. Va.
300, 85 S.E. 544(1915).
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tical recourse is to sue the operator for the past due royalties.99 When one
considers that financial difficulty is the most likely explanation for the
failure to pay the royalties, the inadequacy of the remedy is apparent. A
workable solution to the dilemma is for the lease to provide for termina-
tion at the landowner's option if a default in royalty payments continues
for a stated period of time; e.g., if royalties are payable monthly, the land-
owner may declare the lease forfeited if the default extends for three
months. "0
A third common problem confronted by the landowner concerned
with maximizing his return in an oil and gas leasing transaction relates to
the timing and extent of exploration and development of the leased land.
The first aspect of this problem is a function of the number or size of tracts
to be subjected to a given lease. Typically, the secondary term of the
habendum clause is invoked by the drilling and putting into production of
a single well. Thus, an oil and gas lease may be "held" without obligation
to pay delay rentals by the drilling of a single well, no matter how large the
area covered by the lease. Although the operator is still generally subject to
the implied covenants of reasonable exploration and development, it is
preferable, from the landowner's perspective, to lease separately each tract
of land, thus imposing separate obligations upon the lessee to produce in
order to extend each lease into its secondary term.'' Although operators
would prefer to lease all of a lessor's land on one lease form, separate
leases for noncontiguous tracts of land are usually acceptable and ad-
visable.
A more difficult situation arises when the tract to be leased is so large
that a number of wells must be drilled in order to explore and develop it
adequately. While oil and gas leases are subject to implied covenants of
reasonable exploration and development, 0 2 the legal standard for es-
99 Turner, Remedies for Failure to Pay Royalties, 14 Rocvv MT. MIN. L. INST. 407, 424
(1968). Failure to pay royalties when due may give rise to a statutory remedy of cancellation in
North Dakota. SeeN.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-39.1 (1961).
100 For example: "If Lessee shall fail or refuse to make the payment of any sum due by the
provisions of this lease as royalty on the production within three (3) months after same shall come
due, this lease may be subject to forfeiture by Lessor by notice given in writing to Lessee at the ad-
dress shown above or at such other address as Lessee shall request from time to time, Such notice
shall recite the facts constituting the default and declare the forfeiture." Such forfeiture provisions
will be strictly construed by the courts, no doubt because of the element of unjust enrichment to
the landowner. See, e.g., Headley v. Hoopengarner, 60 W. Va. 626, 55 S.E. 744 (1906).
1O See, e.g., Newell v. McMillan, 139 Kan. 94,30 P.2d 126 (1934).
102 There is a large body of literature on the subject of implied covenants. See, e.g., Mer-
rill, Current Problems in the Law of Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases, 23 TEX. L. REV.
137 (1947); M. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES (2d ed. 1940): Brown,
Covenants Implied in an Oil and Gas Lease, A.B.A. Sect. M. and N.R.L. (1960); Walker, The
Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, II TEX. L. REV. 399,
401 (1933); E. BROWN, OIL AND GAS LEASES, § 16.01-05 (2d ed. 1973); Martin, A Modern Look at
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tablishing a breach of either of these covenants is rigorous and the burden
of proof is both difficult and expensive for the landowner to meet." 3 To
avoid these difficulties, the landowner's counsel may consider negotiating
a schedule for exploration or development drilling, e.g., to require the drill-
ing of the first well on the property within a short period of time with addi-
tional development or exploratory wells to follow at stated intervals. 4
However, provision for scheduled exploration and development in an oil
and gas lease may negate the implied covenants, leaving the landowner
no right to demand the drilling of wells other than those re-
ferred to in the drilling schedule." 5 Moreover, the difficulties of
negotiating and drafting such schedules are substantial because of the
necessity for precise definition of the terms used and consideration of
numerous eventualities. This is particularly true when it is unknown at the
time of leasing whether the tract leased will produce substantial oil or gas
or from what geologic formations production may be obtained. Unless
there is a high probability of finding oil and gas in substantial quantities, it
may be preferable to rely upon the implied covenants rather than to at-
tempt to negotiate and draft an exploration and development schedule.
Implied Covenants to Explore, Develop, and Market Under Mineral Leases, 21st S.W. LEGAL
FOUNDATION INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 177 (1976).
103 As the Court said in Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905); "(N]o
breach can occur (of the prudent operator standard] save where the absence of such diligence is
both certain and substantial in view of the actual circumstances at the time, as distinguished from
mere expectations on the part of the lessor and conjecture on the part of mining enthusiasts. The
large expense incident to the work of exploration and development in the fact that the lessee must
bear the loss if the operations are not successful, require that he proceed with due regard to his
own interests, as well as those of the lessor. No obligation rests on him to carry the operations
beyond the point where they will be profitable to him, even if some benefit to the lessor would
result from them. It is only to the end that the oil and gas shall be extracted with benefit or profit
to both that reasonable diligence is required. Whether or not in any particular instance such
diligence is exercised depends upon a variety of circumstances such as the quantity of oil and gas
capable of being produced from the premises, as indicated by prior exploration and development,
the local market or demand therefor or the means of transporting them to market, the extent and
result of the operations, if any, on adjacent lands, the character of the natural reservoir-whether
such is to permit the drainage of a large area by each well-and the usages of the business.
Whatever, in the circumstances, would be reasonably expected of operators of ordinary prudence,
having regard to the interests of both lessor and lessee, is what is required." Id. at 814.
104 Because the courts have expressed different theories as to the measure of damages for
breach of such exploration and development schedule, caution suggests the schedule be ac-
companied by a lease clause providing for liquidated damages in the event of breach. Castleberry,
supra note 22, at 445-46.
105 Presumably the lessee still would have the obligation to act in good faith, but would not
be held to the standard of the reasonably prudent operator. See Gulf Prod. Co. v. Kishi, 129 Tex.
487, 103 S.W.2d 965 (1937). But see Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Masterson, 271 F.2d 310 (5th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 952 (1960). Some commentators have criticized the conclusion that
including a drilling schedule in a lease is necessarily inconsistent with the implied covenants of
reasonable exploration and development. See, e.g., 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, at §
835.3.
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A third and final aspect of this problem area relates to the presence of
pooling and unitization clauses in oil and gas leases. Although the terms
are frequently used interchangeably, "pooling" refers to putting together
tracts or parts of tracts to form a drilling unit under well spacing rules."
"Unitization," on the other hand, refers to bringing together all or part of
the well units over a producing reservoir under the direction of a single
operator to maximize production from that reservoir.' 7 In general, a pool-
ing or unitization clause in an oil and gas lease will give the operator
authority to pool or unitize all or parts of the tracts leased without the
necessity of approval from the landowner.'08 Further, the clause will pro-
vide that production from a well drilled on land with which any part of the
leased tract is pooled or unitized will be considered production from the
lqased tract for the purpose of satisfying the habendum clause's require-
ment of "production" to extend the lease to its secondary term. Thus, it is
possible for an operator to use a pooling or unitization clause to extend the
lease into its secondary term without drilling a well on the leased
premises."° Likewise, it is the usual case that a landowner on whose pro-
106 Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Rein, 534 P.2d 1277 (Okla. 1974); Whelan v. Manziel, 314
S.W.2d 126, 132 (Tex. Ct. App. 1958) (err. ref'd n.r.e.). See also King, Pooling and Unitization
of Oiland Gas.Leases, 46 MICH. L. REV. 311,313 (1948).
107 E.g., Woody v. Corporation Comm'n, 265 P.2d 1102 (Okla. 1954). See also King,
supra note 106.
108 "Absent the express authority to do so, a lessee would have no right to pool the in-
terests in the estate retained by the lessor with those of other lessors." Knight v. Chicago Corp.,
144 Tex. 98, 104, 188 S.W.2d 564, 566 (1945). See also Long, The Pooling Clause in an Oil and
Gas Lease, 11 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1958).
109 A typical oil and gas lease formulation illustrating the interrelationship of the term
clause and the unitization clause provides:
"2. Subject to the other provisions herein contained, this lease shall be for a primary term
of ......... years from this date and for so long thereafter as oil or gas is produced from the above
described land or from land pooled with all or any part thereof.
"5. Lessee, at its option, is hereby given the right and power to pool or combine the land
covered by this lease, or any portion thereof, or formations thereunder, as to oil and gas, or either
of them, either before or after production, any other land covered by this lease, and/or with any
other land, lease or leases when in lessee's judgment it is necessary or advisable to do so in order to
properly develop or operate said premises, and irrespective of whether authorities similar to this
exist with respect to such other land, lease or leases, such pooling to be into a well or units not ex-
ceeding forty (40) acres, plus an acreage tolerance of 10 per cent (10%) of forty (40) acres, for oil,
and not exceeding six hundred and forty (640) acres, plus an acreage tolerance of ten per cent
(10%) of six hundred and forty (640) acres, for gas, except that larger units may be created to con-
form to any spacing or well unit pattern that may be prescribed by governmental authorities hav-
ing jurisdiction. The pooling in one or more instances shall not exhaust the rights of the lessee
hereunder to pool this lease or portions thereof, or formations thereunder, into other units, Lessee
shall execute in writing and place of record an instrument or instruments identifying and describ-
ing the pooled acreage. Production, drilling or reworking operations anywhere on a unit which in-
cludes all or a part of this lease shall be treated as if it were production, drilling or reworking
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perty a well is drilled pursuant to the exercise of a pooling or unitization
clause in the lease will receive less than the full 1/8 royalty for production
from that well."'
Generally, pooling and unitization are beneficial to the landowner;
the former operates to protect his interest in rapid development with as
many wells as possible being drilled to the reservoir under his property,
while the latter operates to maximize the total production from the reser-
voir. Because pooling or unitization may be used by an unscrupulous
operator to extend several leases into their secondary terms by the drilling
of a single well,"' it is preferable from the landowner's viewpoint that he
decide whether to agree to a proposed pooling or unitization on a case-by-
case basis. Therefore, counsel for the landowner should try to delete pool-
ing and unitization clauses from proposed leases whenever possible. In
many negotiating situations this is not difficult. If, for example, the lessee
is an independent operator who expects to maintain close contact with his
lessors, he may anticipate that he will be able to secure the necessary agree-
ment without difficulty when he has a drilling venture at hand. With major
operators, however, or with those who engage in "absentee management,"
it will be more difficult to obtain agreement to such a deletion."'
A final problem area related to maximizing the landowner's return on
the oil and gas leasing transaction arises when the lease offered contains a
gas storage clause. The critical shortages of natural gas experienced by
many states in early 1977 have stirred new interest on the part of public
utilities in expansion of their gas storage facilities. Thus, many operators
have begun including clauses in their lease forms which permit the operator
or his assigns to use the leased property for gas storage purposes."'
operations under this lease. In lieu of the royalties (excepting shut-in gas royalties) elsewhere
herein specified, lessor shall receive from a unit so formed only such portion of the royalty
stipulated herein as the amount of his acreage placed in the unit or his royalty interest therein bears
to the total acreage so pooled in the particular unit involved. In the absence of production lessee
may terminate any unitized area by filing of record notice of termination." (Emphasis added.)
110 Under a unitization clause, the landowner would also receive his pro rata share of the
one-eighth royalty on production from other wells within the unit, although not drilled upon his
property. See the discussion at 6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, at § 951.
III In their treatise Professors Williams and Meyers discuss cases which indicate the
development of an implied duty of fair dealing on the part of the operator toward the lessor in the
exercise of the pooling or unitization power given by the lease. See4 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra
note 2, at § 670.2 As Williams and Meyers note, however, the character and scope of the duty re-
main poorly defined at present. Id. See, e.g., Boone v. Kerr-McGee Oil Indus., Inc., 217 F.2d 63
(10th Cir. 1954); Southwest Gas Prod. Co. v. Seale, 191 So. 2d 115 (Miss. 1966).
112 Should it prove impossible to delete the pooling or unitization clause, the landowner
should require a site damage clause. Otherwise, the landowner may find himself in the unenviable
situation of having all the drilling and its consequent damage located on his land, while he receives
only his proportionate share of the royalty.
113 For example:
"The Lessor, for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) in hand paid by the
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From the landowner's viewpoint, gas storage clauses are ob-
jectionable"4 for at least three reasons. First, the compensation provided
for, typically $100 to $200 per year, is grossly inadequate in light of the
potential interference with landowner's future use of the surface, e.g., sub-
division for residential purposes." 5 Second, at least where storage wells are
drilled to reservoirs which have not been previously depleted, operation of
gas storage wells will ultimately remove whatever gas was in place beneath
the leased land as well as that injected for storage. Thus, the landowner's
Lessee, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and of the covenants and agreements
hereinafter contained, does hereby lease and let unto the Lessee for the purpose of drilling,
operating for, producing and removing oil and gas and all the constituents thereof on, from and
under the following described lands, and for the further purpose of injecting, storing and holding
in storage, and removing gas, including gas lying thereunder, by pumping through wells or other
means, into, in and from any sands, strata or formations underlying said lands, regardless of the
source of such gas or the location of the wells or other means of so doing:
"In full compensation for the use of the leased premises for the purposes of injecting, stor-
ing or holding in storage, and removing gas into, in and from any sands, strata or formations
underlying the leased premises Lessee shall pay Lessor each year, quarterly in advance, (1) a
storage rental equivalent to $200.00 for or on account of each well located on the leased premises
and used for such purposes, or (2) if no wells shall be used on the leased premises for such pur-
poses, a storage rental in the amount equivalent to the Delay Rental hereinbefore specified. The
Lessee at any time may notify the Lessor in writing at the address of Lessor last known to Lessee,
by registered or certified mail, of the Lessee's intention to use the leased premises, together with
any well or wells located thereon, for any and all of the gas storage purposes hereinbefore specified
of injecting, storing, or holding in storage, and removing gas into, in and from any sands, strata or
formations underlying the leased premises, and upon the giving of such notice the Lessee may use
the leased premises, together with any well or wells located thereon, for any or all of said gas
storage purposes. Payment for storage use shall commence on the date such use begins, shall con-
tinue until the leased premises shall no longer be used for storage purposes, and shall be in lieu of
all delay rentals or royalties for the right to produce and remove, and the production and removal
of, gas from the sands, strata or formations in which gas is stored by the Lessee. The Lessee shall
pay the Lessor for all damage to growing crops, trees and fences caused by the Lessee's operations
under this lease, said damages, if not mutually agreed upon, to be ascertained and determined by
three disinterested persons, one thereof to be appointed by the Lessor, one by the Lessee, and the
third by the two so appointed, and the award of such three persons shall be final and conclusive."
(Emphasis added.)
114 It is not uncommon for owners of land subject to gas storage leases to be so incensed at
the burden to which their land is subjected that they attempt to set aside the storage lease by litiga-
tion. The landowner in such a suit was successful in Rayl v. East Ohio Gas Co., 46 Ohio App. 2d
167, 348 N.E.2d 385 (1973), in which an Ohio court of appeals held that a gas storage agreement
which was terminable after a ten-year primary period upon the failure of the "lessee" to produce,
store, or withdraw gas from underground storage areas became a tenancy at will once the primary
term expired and thus subject to termination upon reasonable notice by either party. However,
this decision was effectively overruled by the Ohio Supreme Court in Myers v. East Ohio Gas Co.,
51 Ohio St. 2d 121, 364 N.E.2d 1369 (1977), in which that court refused to follow the reasoning of
the Raylcase on the grounds that that decision did not effect the intentions of the parties.
115 See the discussion accompanying notes 33-42, supra.
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gas may be produced without payment of a royalty." 6 Third, gas storage
clauses are inconsistent with the landowner's basic goal of exploration for
and development of the oil and gas in place under the premises. For these
reasons, the landowner's lawyer should categorically refuse to accept a gas
storage clause in an oil and gas lease. Use of the premises for gas storage
should be the subject of separate negotiation and compensation.
As can be seen from the discussion above, the landowner's interest in
maximizing his return requires consideration of much more than merely
the amount of the royalty to be paid on production. The key to represen-
ting the landowner effectively is to review the lease to assure that the
operator pays adequately for the rights that he receives and that the lease
terms do not conceal grants of rights for which the operator has not paid.
Conclusion
The conscientious attorney who takes his landowner client through
all of the analysis suggested in this article may find his client to be so im-
pressed with the potential pitfalls that he will decide not to enter into a leas-
ing transaction at all. It must be noted that there is danger in such a posi-
tion. Because of the fugacious nature of oil and gas and the spacing rules
most producing states have adopted to promote conservation," 7 the
landowner who refuses to enter into an oil and gas lease may find that
substantial portions of the oil and gas under his property have been remov-
ed by wells drilled on adjacent property. If the holdout landowner owns a
tract too small to qualify for a well under the applicable spacing rules, he
may find that he has effectively been frozen out of his rights to the oil and
gas under his property by the development of adjacent property. Although
most states make provision for the drilling of wells on "exception tracts,"
they usually require that production from these wells be prorationed in
relation to the size of the tract upon which they are drilled to the size of the
minimum drilling unit as set by law or rule."8 Therefore, the drilling of an
"exception tract" well may be economically unprofitable.
Practicality dictates that the landowner in an area being developed
for oil and gas negotiate seriously to enter into an oil and gas lease. It is
highly unlikely that counsel for the landowner will be able to negotiate an
116 Note that the language quoted in note 113, supra, specifically grants the lessee the right
to remove gas lying under the leased land without any compensation other than the storage royal-
ty.
117 E.g., 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1 (Supp. 1977). For an overview of conservation laws and
their impact, see the discussion at Emens & Lowe, Ohio Oil and Gas Conservation Law- The First
Ten Years (1965-1975), 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 31, 32 (1976).
118 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 1509.29 (Page Supp. 1977).
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agreement containing all of the inclusions or deletions suggested in this ar-
ticle. It is probably not even desirable; in order to be workable, the lease
must allow the operator reasonable flexibility." 9 However, an informed
analysis of the landowner's interest in the transaction will permit choices to
be made and priorities to be assigned so that those interests can be effec-
tively advanced. Moreover, designation and discussion of potential
problem areas in the course of negotiations is likely to have a prophylactic
effect even where the negotiations do not result in modification of the lease
form presented.
In the months since the above article was written, two thoughts have
occurred to me which I wish to add.
First, there is an addendum to the discussion in the text at notes 14
and 16 on the necessity for the landowner's lawyer to assure himself that
his client has title to the minerals to be leased because of potential liability
under the warranty clause. The problem noted can be avoided simply by
striking the warranty and proportionate reduction clauses from the lease
offered. That is difficult to negotiate in the midwest, because oil and gas
leases are typically taken before a title search is run on the property and a
lease without a warranty is seen by the lessee as a signal of a title problem.
In areas in which title searches are run before the lease is taken, however,
the lessee might have less objection to deletion of the warranty and propor-
tionate reduction clauses.
Second, the discussion in the text at note 101 on maximizing the
return of the landowner by limiting the number or size of tracts covered by
a single lease could be expanded by noting that the geological formations
or the horizons or zones subjected to the lease might be limited, as well.
This is frequently done in parts of Louisiana and Texas. It may be ac-
complished either by limiting the granting clause of the lease to a particular
formation, horizon, or zone, e.g., "the Clinton formation" or the "T-
Sand of the Frio formation located in McAllen Ranch Field, Hildalgo
County, Texas" , or by adding a provision to the term clause to the effect
that the lease will terminate at the end of the primary term as to any
horizon or zone from which there is not then production in paying quan-
tities. Either approach limits the lessee's ability to "hold" property from
which oil and gas can be produced.
119 An operator friend and sometime client of the author expressed his friendly disgust at
the totality of suggestions of this article by saying, "The only operator who will give you Ithe
lawyer representing the landowner] all of that list is one who will have no intention of complying
with any of them." The point is well taken. This article is prompted by the author's concern that
many oil and gas lease forms currently in use give the operator unfair advantages, A lease which
incorporated all of the measures considered above might be so advantageous to the landowner as
to hamstring the lessee's ability to operate.
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